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I. Introduction: Making friends in Geneva 
Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel recounts an anecdote related to an ICCA conference held in Geneva in 2011.1 In 
his words,  
… investment arbitration should and does contribute to the further development of international law. Some will 
remember that esteemed colleagues like Emanuel Gaillard feel strongly that arbitral tribunals should make efforts in this 
regard when writing their awards. But some may also remember that I expressed the opinion, which I still hold today, 
that we should be very much aware that arbitral tribunals receive their authority and mandate from the parties and 
institutions which appoint them for the case at hand. And that mandate is to decide on the relief sought, and to consider 
all factual and legal issues relevant for that decision, no less, but also no more. When I ventured to simplify this approach 
by saying: ‘There are too many professors in arbitration’, I did not make friends with everybody in the audience.2 
A few years later, and a few hundred meters down Avenue de France, a different scenario played out. 
Dissatisfied with the performance of the WTO Appellate Body, the US blocked the reappointment of one 
their members, Seung Wha Chang.3 One of the justifications given was his participation to the drafting of 
a number of Appellate Body Reports that, according to the US, had gone too far. This point has long been 
a concern of the US with regards to their participation in the WTO. In the Annual Report issued by the 
US Trade Representative in late 2017 an entire section is devoted to the tendency of the AB to ‘Issu[e] 
Advisory Opinions on Issues Not Necessary to Resolve a Dispute’,4 and the seriousness of the concern is 
demonstrated employing the rather extraordinary technique of quantitatively determined what can only 
be called the ‘ratio-to-obiter ratio’. Spelling it out, the example may be recalled of the Argentina – Goods and 
Services AB report, which was found by American official to consists, for two-thirds of its length, of asides, 
considerations unnecessary for the solution of the dispute at issue.5 
These examples have more in common than a view on the lake. They both constitute the expression of a 
specific type of unease, one prompted by the uncertain boundaries of the international judicial function. 
On the one hand, there is the question of what should be said by the adjudicator resolving a given dispute. 
On the other hand, the problem concerns the use of previous pronouncements by future international 
adjudicators: is there a limit? Böckstiegel’s remarks, though made tongue-in-cheek, are testament to the 
concern shared by many arbitration professionals to be seen as carrying out their function within the strict 
limits of their mandate. Real public concerns about the enormous concentration of power in the hands of 
arbitrators sitting on tribunals capable of striking down regulatory measures of sovereign states are hardly 
an incentive for appearing engaged in a quasi-professorial process of development of the law. The 
resolution of narrowly-defined disputes has the potential to appear more acceptable and, perhaps most 
                                               
1 KH Bockstiegel, ‘Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different Are They Today?: The Lalive Lecture 2012’ 
(2012) 28 Arbitration International 577, 588. 
2 ibid. 
3 ‘United States Blocks Reappointment of WTO Appellate Body Member’ (2016) 110 American Journal of International Law 
573; ‘EJIL: Talk! – The USA and Re-Appointment at the WTO: A “Legitimacy Crisis”?’ <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-usa-
and-re-appointment-at-the-wto-a-legitimacy-crisis/> accessed 11 May 2018. 
4 The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, 27. 
5 Statement by the United States at 9 May 2016 DSB Meeting, https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/May-9-DSB.pdf. 
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importantly for those who seek reappointment, less like a personal instance of overstepping.6 In the 
context of the resolution of trade disputes, the idea that the ‘crown jewel’ of the multilateral trading system 
might, contrary to its mandate,7 ‘add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements’ sounds worrisome to some actors, especially in light of the virtually perfect level of 
compliance with its decisions and the development of a nascent doctrine of precedent. Since both the 
panels and the Appellate Body appear to take previous reports quite seriously,8 and the Appellate Body is 
very likely to reverse on appeal panel reports that depart from its interpretation, it is understandable that 
WTO members could be concerned by jurisdictional and jurisprudential overreach. 
Much, though not all, of the discussion may be seen as hinging on the traditional (if legal culture-specific) 
distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. The traditional view in the common law—where a 
formal, and conventionally ‘rigid’, doctrine of binding precedent is understood to operate, albeit almost 
never with the rigour ascribed to it by civil lawyers—is that only rationes (what was decisive to the 
resolution of a given case) may bind future courts. Dicta are just incidental statements, which may have a 
degree of persuasion, but no binding force on their own. In international adjudication, just like domestic 
courts, dicta elicit unease because they offer a channel for conveying ideas that is less constrained by—
and, by definition, has no relevance to—the actual resolution of the dispute.9 Because they can be 
pronounced on virtually anything, they do not follow the parties’ delimitation of the central legal question 
through pleadings. Regardless of the degree of control exercised by the parties on the dispute settlement 
mechanism,10 they are, at best, a known-unknown. Only remotely connected to the solution of the case at 
issue, they are nonetheless said, if not decided. A later adjudicator will thus have to deal, as Oliphant put 
it, with these ‘mirages of an intellectual dreamland’.11  
What is worse, the ratio/obiter distinction is also complicated by the lack of theoretical clarity on the idea 
of authority from previous decisions in international adjudication. The orthodoxy on the topic is 
needlessly anchored to the sacramental fiction of the theory of sources, or to the analysis of fundamentally 
neutral statutory frameworks.12 General legal theory, too, is generally taken as providing little help in 
                                               
6 Recall René-Jean Dupuy’s remorse over the Texaco Award ('I penned the award as a professor, not as a judge’). See Five Masters 
of International Law: Conversations with R-J Dupuy, E JimÃƒÂ©nez de ArÃƒÂ©chaga, R Jennings, L Henkin and O Schachter (Hart 
Publishing 2011). 
7 See WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Articles 3.2 and 19.2. 
8 Raj Bhala, ‘The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy)’ (1999) 9 J. 
Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 1, Among the many scholarly works addressing this point see; Bhala, ‘The Precedent Setters’; Raj Bhala, 
‘Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy)’ (2000) 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l 
L. Rev. 873; Krzysztof J Pelc, ‘The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application’ (2014) 108 
American Political Science Review 547; Joost Paulwelyn, ‘Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation before the WTO 
Appellate Body’ in Joanna Jemielniak (ed), Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2016). 
9 Compare Zachary Douglas, ‘Can a Doctrine of Precedent Be Justified in Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ (2010) 25 ICSID 
Review 104, 107. 
10 Consider the arguments presented in Eric A Posner and John C Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ 
[2005] California Law Review 1. 
11 Herman Oliphant, ‘A Return to Stare Decisis’ (1928) 14 American Bar Association Journal 71, 107. One may also want to 
recall superbly insightful, if less lyrical, comment of Lord Bowen, in whose view dicta, ‘like the proverbial chickens of destiny, 
come home to roost sooner or later in a very uncomfortable way to the Judges who have uttered them’. See Cooke v. New River 
Company (1888), L. R. 38 C. D. 70. 
12 Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that ‘[t]he Court shall apply… subject to the 




practice by portraying precedent as something very complex and very simple at the same time: very 
complex, because of the great many problems that arise from the construction of a concept, as well as from 
the many theoretical approaches that can be used in the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the 
phenomenon; very simple, too, because precedent is described at the maximum level of abstraction, the 
troubles of taking the analysis from the world of ideas to the courtroom being mostly unaddressed. In the 
real world: a precedent may have several rationes, there may be hierarchical questions that limit its 
strength, and persuasiveness and bindingness may be based on a variety of other factors. Finally, what the 
ratio is might not matter at all: the way something was said—rectius: written—rather than decided in a 
previous case, might carry the day.  
These considerations provide the starting point for this article, which seeks to provide a fresh appraisal of 
the ratio /obiter distinction and its significance in the context of international adjudication and arbitration. 
Rather than starting from specific assumptions connected to the common law / civil law divide, it seeks to 
frame the issue within the problem of the doctrine of precedent (at the theoretical level and in 
international law) and formulate hypotheses (Part II), further providing an assessment of the practice of 
international adjudicators on this point (Part III), and ultimately resituating by considering different 
accounts of how things may be accomplished by using previous decisions (Part IV). 
II. Problematizing dicta 
A. Scope and rationale of the putative obligation to follow precedent: A quick theoretical primer 
There are at least four models—or, as some may argue, three and a half—which may be said to describe 
the ways precedent may prompt respect by a future decision-maker. Let us consider them briefly to clarify 
the arguments that will addressed later, with the caveat that what follows is a nothing more than a very 
simplified account among the many that could be considered. 
a) In the first, weakest model the later adjudicator is not concerned—at all—with the quality of 
precedent of the previous decision. To the extent that the argument is convincing, she can employ 
it because it is persuasive. There is, with the qualifiers that will be considered sub d), no obligation 
to do so. When this model is followed, the previous decision is not, strictly speaking, a precedent 
at all, or, at least, it is a precedent that has more to do with the substantive reasons of a decision 
than with its authoritative source;13 
b) The second model, which may be called the epistemic, is based on the idea of deference to past 
authorities who are understood to know what the law is. A decision of the ICJ, a body comprising 
fifteen most highly qualified individuals representing the legal cultures of the world, taken after 
careful consideration of the available legal sources and hearing the arguments of skilled counsel 
on both sides, is understood to command respect. This provides a basis for the practice of 
following it, but allows limitations dictated by common sense. It is perhaps with this in mind that 
                                               
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’ (emphasis added), while Article 59 provides that [t]he decision of the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case’. There is ample consensus that 
Article 59 was neither introduced for, nor necessarily entails, a prohibition on the operation of a doctrine of precedent of some 
kind: for the most celebrated version of this argument, see M Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge 
University Press 1996) 99–100. 




Lauterpacht spoke of the product of arbitral jurisprudence as ‘a body of precedent which is full of 
instruction and authority’;14 
c) The third model boils down to practical reasons. Precedent may be followed for reasons including, 
but not limited to, efficiency, ensuring consistency, stabilizing expectations, improving the 
adjudicator’s cognition of the law, and bolstering a court’s legitimacy.15 In this context, the idea of 
practical reasons encompasses consequentialist arguments.16 Note that all these rationales may 
support, but are not inherently connected to, the establishment of a rule of precedent. 
d) Finally, a precedent may be followed because a rule so requires—a rule, it bears noting, that may 
amount to the legal translation of the views listed sub a), b), and c). If, and when, this is the case, 
the question becomes one of determining the breadth of the scope of the obligation to follow 
precedent. In Anglo-American law one of the pillars of this exercise is the quest for the 
determination of the ratio decidendi of a judgment, which is, truly, its only part capable of 
constraining the later adjudicator. It is this peculiarity that makes it possible for certain theorists 
to entertain the fallacy that cases have rationes only where a positive obligation to follow prior 
decisions exists.17  
Most theoretical accounts concerning precedent in international adjudication focus on one or more of 
these aspects separately, but generally fail to account for the complexity of the precedent-application 
phenomenon. While this attitude is the product of several reasons, the claim made here is that judicial 
decisions are generally perceived as important in the resolution not just of disputes, but—and the 
difference is material—of specific legal questions too. Accordingly, different players often comment on 
the need to limit the influence of precedent, just like they would do where a doctrine of binding precedent 
operates. By doing so, however, they import biases and methodologies typical of one specific system into 
one that does not accept the latter’s premises. 
B. Scope and rationale of the putative obligation to follow precedent: Ratio, obiter, and the quest 
for intellectual rigour 
International adjudicators are sometimes criticised on account on account of a lack of rigour in identifying 
the ratio of a certain decision and thus deciding on what is said to be a shaky basis. This type of criticism, 
when taken in isolation, may be found convincing. The problem of these arguments, however, is that they 
tend to assume that only one way of reasoning with prior decisions exists. To make the accusation more 
unambiguous, and summarise the argument made in this section, the trouble is that they attempt to 
clinically and artificially isolate the question of the scope of the authority to follow precedent from the 
question of what any use of precedent aims to pursue, with little regard for both the existing relevant rules 
on international adjudication and judicial and arbitral practice.  
The discussion in the next section examines three superbly crafted examples of such criticism, both 
approaching the question from similar premises and ultimately reaching similar conclusions. While they 
                                               
14 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Praeger 1958) 17. 
15 An expanded discussion is offered in Frederick Schauer, ‘Precedent’ (1987) 39 Stanford Law Review 571, 579. 
16 For a general overview of consequentialist justifications for precedent see Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent 
(CUP 2008) 153. 
17 ibid 71 (Discussing the practice of the CJEU.); For a critique of this argument, see Jan Komárek, ‘Reasoning with Previous 




serve our analysis well from this point of view, it must be observed that they, too, represent an 
oversimplification of a rather complex problem. Separating the ratio from obiter dicta is a difficult 
endeavour, and many approaches are possible for cases more complicated than the rather clear-cut 
examples that will be presented in these examples and the analysis that follows. 
1. Paulsson’s view of the decision-making function 
One of the most compelling and articulated treatments of precedent in international investment 
arbitration has been offered, with the usual clarity of thought, by Jan Paulsson in a well-hidden essay.18 The 
discussion hinged on what he perceived as an example of lack of rigour by international arbitrators, which 
he addressed with a relatively straightforward argument. Assume that an award contains the proposition 
that an investment satisfies both the ICSID Convention and the BIT definitions of investment.19 If the 
award is taken as a precedent, can the proposition that ‘an investment must satisfy both definitions’ serve 
as its ratio if the claim is upheld? Paulsson’s answer is a resolute ‘no’: it is only ratio if the claim is dismissed 
because it failed under one ground and the tribunal states that the result under the other ground is 
immaterial.20 This is but a version of the argument whereby what matters is ‘the rule as used rather than 
the rule as stated’.21 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether this is a tenable version of the concept of ratio,22 it 
must be observed Paulsson’s approach is not naively outcome-driven. It is predicated on the idea that any 
version of precedential constraint by a prior decision must be an expression of its decision-making 
function, which, he contends, is only ‘exercised when a tribunal upholds or denies a claim’.23 Accordingly, 
he calls for more rigour on the part of international arbitrators who may often decide a case on the basis of 
something that does not quite satisfy this test.  
2. Jennings and the Mavrommatis test 
These considerations are not novel in the field of international law, and are in fact quite similar to 
analogous concerns advanced by Jennings in his plea for learning from common lawyers.24 Speaking of the 
practice of the ICJ, Jennings complained of a lack of intellectual discipline which seemed to affect even the 
World Court, which was not ‘above citing passages from previous judgments almost as if any 
pronouncement by the Court may be cited, not because it embodies the decision in the case but because 
it is a passage that has become hallowed into something akin to Holy Writ’.25 He gave a celebrated 
example, the illustrious Mavrommatis dictum, in which the PCIJ articulated what has served, and still 
                                               
18 Jan Paulsson, ‘The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration’ in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed), Arbitration under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (2010). 
19 ICSID Convention, Article 25(1). 
20 Paulsson (n 18) 705–6 It is possible to entertain the argument that any discussion of failure or success under the second 
ground would simply be immaterial and thus obiter. 
21 John Gardner, ‘Some Types of Law’ in Douglas E Edlin (ed), Common Law Theory (Cambridge University Press 2007) 68–
70. 
22 Rupert Cross and JW Harris, Precedent in English Law (4 edition, Clarendon Press 1991) 72; It may be worth adding that 
Paulsson concedes that his conclusios may be unpalatable. See (n 18) 705. 
23 Paulsson (n 18) 705. 
24 RY Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law’ (1996) 45 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 9. 




largely serves, as a test for the definition of what a dispute is.26 The formulation was rather abstract, and, if 
Paulsson’s test is to be applied, even unnecessary for the decision itself, thus not qualifying as the ratio of 
the case. What is more, it is highly questionable whether the definition may still be considered formally 
correct today—or at the time of Jennings’s writing, for that matter. Neither weakness, however, has 
prevented the quotation of the passage as an instance of ‘established case law’ in twenty-nine ICJ cases 
over sixty years.27 
3. The hero of the common law at the ICJ: Judge Read and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case 
In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. the case hinged on the interpretation to be given to the Persian declaration of 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court. Judge Read took issue with the majority Judgment, arguing 
that its restrictive interpretation of the jurisdictional clause was not appropriate. Read did not find direct 
support for his contrary view, but did not omit—perhaps in keeping with his past at the Canadian bar28—
to disclose and address putative adverse authorities.29 These rather directly contradicted his claim, 
supporting the majority, but were not, in his view, true precedents: in fact, the decisions he referred to were 
mere dicta, statements that did not constitute the basis of a decisions of the Court.30 In his view, these dicta 
did not provide authority for the proposition that it was possible to interpret a jurisdictional clause 
narrowly. On the contrary, they provided evidence that the Court had never based a decision on this point. 
To bring the point home, he observed that 
Article 38 of the Statute is mandatory, and not discretionary. It requires the Court to apply judicial decisions as a 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. The expression “judicial decisions” certainly includes the 
jurisprudence of this Court and of the Permanent Court. I have no doubt that it includes the principles applied by the 
Court as the basis of its decisions. It is, however, equally clear that it cannot possibly be construed as requiring this Court 
to apply obiter dicta.  
This paragraph seems paradigmatic of a certain attitude to precedent, and indeed it has been criticised for 
being overly common-lawyerly.31 Judge Read was—correctly—pointing out that the Court cannot 
choose not to apply the sources listed in Article 38. For judicial decisions, however, this only meant that 
facing the past could not be avoided, not that the past always carries the same weight. 
C. The judicial function: The basis of a rule of precedent-recognition? 
The problem with these approaches is that intellectual rigour might be beside the point. What is concealed 
behind them—or under the cloak of judicial propriety—is the claim that something akin to an embryonic 
                                               
26 PCIJ Series A, No. 2, p. 11. 
27 Starting with Ambatielos (Merits), Judgment of May 19th, 1953: ICJ Reports 1953, p. 10 and ending with Obligations 
concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United 
Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2016, p. 833. 
28 Shabtai Rosenne, ‘Judge John E. Read and the International Court of Justice’ (1980) 17 Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law / Annuaire canadien de droit international 3. 
29 Different jurisdictions vary widely in terms of duties imposed on counsel to deal with adverse precedent, with the American 
legal system being perhaps the one where the duty to disclose such authorities is most extensive. 
30 Ibid. (‘In support of the contention that a restrictive interpretation should be applied, it is possible to cite certain obiter dicta 
of the Permanent Court’.) 
31 Alain Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in Andreas Zimmermann and others (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 




form of rule of recognition, and, specifically, a rule of precedent-recognition, should exist.32 In this particular 
context, this is done by insisting that focus should be placed on the ratio, so that only that can be properly 
taken into account and assigned precedential value. In other words, the authority of a precedent in 
supporting a proposition is thought to be a function of its decisiveness in the solution of a prior case. In 
Paulsson, Jennings, and Read’s view, every other use of prior decisions amounts to something that does 
not quite qualify as a reasoning by precedent. 
To an extent, this attitude is circular because it merely applies one of the many possible versions of a theory 
of precedent instead of constructing one from the ground up, that is to say, from the analysis of the current 
practice. Incidentally, it applies a theory predicated on the generally binding effect of decisions by the 
precedent adjudicator on the present, which is unlikely to resemble the model that international law is 
understood to have adopted, and it does so by applying constructs that have been developed precisely to, 
inter alia, soften the effects of the obligation to follow previous judgments.33 The account is a normative 
one and appears to be based on three distinct elements: first, the idea that it is the decision-making 
function that makes a pronouncement authoritative; second, an entrenched idea of the judicial function 
as dispute-settlement, and not system-building, oriented; third, it is submitted, a fascination with the 
common law tradition.34  
Leaving aside for the moment the third point, where does this idea come from? Though it is open to debate 
whether the sources invoked in support of this proposition actually contain any compelling indicia on this 
point, the issue can be easily traced back to the idea that the function of deciding international disputes 
must be subject to hard external limits, which serve as a bulwark against judicial legislation.35 To emphasize 
the concept of the judicial function amounts to endorsing and expressing a positive judgment on the 
characteristic features of that activity. Restraint and mindfulness of the judicial role are traditionally held 
as key to the optimal performance of this function, for states, one oft-adopted model proposes, delegate it 
to international courts for a number of reasons, none of which, according to traditional accounts, are 
expected to result in the creation of new law.36 Needless to say, different accounts of the judicial function 
                                               
32 I rely on Siltala’s account of Hart’s theory of law. See A Theory of Precedent: From Analytical Positivism to a Post-Analytical 
Philosophy of Law (Hart Publishing 2000) 163. This approach is not to be confused with the one adopted by Tai-Heng Cheng 
in his ‘Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2007) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 1024. 
33 Douglas (n 9) 107. This does not mean that drawing the distinction between ratio and obiter is ‘to accept the doctrine of stare 
decisis, at least at the theoretical level’ though Professors Cross and Harris may disagree: (n 22) 17. 
34 On the anecdotal level, common lawyers are quick to criticise different models. For example, consider Roger Alford’s 
comment on the ‘far inferior’ quality and ‘deficient ECJ drafting’ in ‘Opinio Juris » Blog Archive The Inferior Quality of ECJ 
Decisions - Opinio Juris’ <http://opiniojuris.org/2007/10/31/the-inferior-quality-of-ecj-decisions/> accessed 5 April 2018. 
Although it is generally true that most statements concerning the ratio / obiter distinction are the product of common law-
educated judges, there are notable exceptions. Shahabuddeen makes the example of Judge Anzilotti’s dissent in Interpretation 
of Judgments No. 7 & 8 (Factory at Chorzow), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 23. However, as Jennings himself correctly remarks, 
Anzilotti’s words referred to res judicata, rather than anything else: see Jennings (n 24) 11.. A more apt comparison is probably 
to be found in Judge Kreća’s separate opinion in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, at 489, para 64 (‘The position of the arbitral tribunal appears to 
be an obiter dictum rather than a precedent stricto sensu’). On a broader level, the fascination with the common law tradition 
may also be a product of the ‘patterns of dominance’ discussed by Anthea Roberts: see Is International Law International? 
(Oxford University Press 2017) passim. 
35 ‘A judge's incautious obiter dictum might by simple repetition become binding on future generations’. See Alan Harding, A 
Social History of English Law (Peter Smith 1973) 357. 
36 The traditional orthodoxy has been challenged. For a stream of the debate, see Posner and Yoo (n 10); Laurence R Helfer 




may differ on this point, though they may not reach the extremes of the polar opposites of Lauterpacht’s 
plea for exhaustiveness37 and the Glamis Gold Tribunal’s system-agnosticism.38  
Without attempting to trigger the ire of scholars in interstitial law-making,39 it certainly does not follow 
from the above that an incidental observation which happens to state the law in a straightforward and 
uncontroversial manner would amount to retrospective judicial legislation, with dangerous implications 
to follow.40 Symmetrically, references to such statements by future judges, as Lauterpacht put it, could 
never be prohibited by any statutory provision.41 There is thus a difference between the acknowledgment 
of the persuasive value of a statement and deference to its author. The risk of confusing the boundary, 
however, may warrant the rule that only the ratio should bind, and that decisions not approaching the use 
of precedent with the necessary rigour should be censured. It would not be difficult to justify one such rule. 
The problem is that it is yet to be established whether one such rule, be it a rule of law or—provided that a 
different is material—a rule of practice,42 operates. 
Note that one such rule could also be based on different justifications. For example, on the 
consequentialist level, restricting the potential of reliance to rationes only may allow for a better protection 
of the legitimate expectations of actors within the systems—assuming that what tribunals have done will 
be clearer than what tribunals have said; following an epistemic—or proficiency-driven—model, rationes 
are more likely to have arisen from the extensive confrontation of the parties’ counsel and the tribunal,43 
though examples to the contrary abound.44 Ultimately, however, to hold that dicta have less value amounts 
to tying the legal correctness of a proposition not just to the actor that has pronounced it, but also to how 
and which context the proposition was pronounced to begin with. Satisfaction of the second leg of this 
test would be ‘not just relevant to legal correctness, but constitutive of it’.45 
                                               
California Law Review 899; Laurence Helfer and Karen Alter, ‘Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International 
Courts’ [2013] Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 
37 Lauterpacht (n 14) 61. 
38 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 8 June 2009. See the comment in W Michael 
Reisman, ‘“Case Specific Mandates” versus “Systemic Implications”: How Should Investment Tribunals Decide?: The 
Freshfields Arbitration Lecture’ (2013) 29 Arbitration International 131. 
39 Recall Holmes J in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), at 221. (‘I recognize without hesitation that judges do 
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.’) 
40 A concern echoing Swift’s preoccupation in the oft-quoted passage from Gulliver’s Travels: ‘It is a maxim among these lawyers, 
that whatever hath been done before may legally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions 
formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind’. 
41 Lauterpacht (n 14) 22; Randy J Kozel, ‘The Scope of Precedent’ (2014) 113 Michigan Law Review 179, 185, arguing that 
‘[a] judge is always free to consider a prior statement for its persuasive value, even if she regards the statement as dispensable 
dicta. Looking to a proposition for its persuasive force is a means of vetting the merits of a legal argument’. 
42 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope A Bulloch and Joseph Raz eds, 2nd edn, Clarendon 1997) 120 ff. 
43 Neil MacCormick, ‘Why Cases Have Rationes and What These Are’ in Laurence Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law (New 
edition edition, Clarendon Press 1991) 170.  
44 For a discussion of the evidence that the concept of erga omnes obligations was addressed in a constructive discussion in the 
Barcelona Traction proceedings, see Maurizio Ragazzi, ‘The Appearance of the Concept of Obligations Erga Omnes on the 
Agenda: The Dictum of the International Court in the Barcelona Traction Case’ (Oxford University Press 2000) 10 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198298700.001.0001/acprof-9780198298700-
chapter-1> accessed 6 April 2018 ff. Indeed, ‘as so often happens, a cryptic statement in a judgment proves to be a reply to or 
refutation of an argument in a judge's appended opinion, and may be virtually unintelligible or even misleading taken in 
isolation’: HWA Thirlway, Non-Appearance before the International Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press 1985) 107. 
45 Richard M Re, ‘Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below’ (2015) 104 Georgetown Law Journal 921, 936. 
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The question, then is whether one such rule has actually found its way into the realm of international 
adjudication. If it has, it may function as a controlling device for careless precedential reasoning, allowing 
the critique of poorly grounded awards and the commination of some type of sanction, be that linked to 
the fate of the decision or that of the decision-maker’s.  
III. The ratio / obiter distinction, according to international adjudicators 
In practice, the distinction between ratio and obiter is only occasionally made overtly by international 
adjudicators. Very few mentions of these concepts may be found in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, and the 
same may be said of the practice of other international tribunals. The following three sections closely 
examine the practice of the ICJ, the WTO Appellate Body, and investment arbitration tribunals to provide 
a discussion of their approach to the issue.  
A. The ICJ 
The distinction between ratio and obiter was only made expressly in a handful of cases within the Court’s 
majority opinions. Beyond the Judgment No. 333 Advisory Opinion cited above, the Court only 
mentioned concept of obiter expressly—and very puzzlingly—in its 2007 Judgment in the Bosnian 
Genocide case.46 The Court stated that ‘it may be necessary to distinguish between, first, the issues which 
have been decided with the force of res judicata, or which are necessarily entailed in the decision of those 
issues; secondly any peripheral or subsidiary matters, or obiter dicta; and finally matters which have not 
been ruled upon at all’.47 To an extent, this statement represent an express recognition of the concept of 
obiter, but its importance cannot be overstated as the Court was concerned with the very narrow question 
of determining what had been decided with binding force with respect to the parties—in other words, 
with the question of res judicata.48 It is doubtful that the distinction was intended to have implications 
stretching beyond that point. This may also find a degree of confirmation in the fact that, in the rare 
instances when the Court discussed the specular notion of ratio decidendi, it did so with references to prior 
judgments intervened between the same parties which it was called upon to examine.49 Overall, this 
remains a matter of confusion in the jurisprudence of the Court, which may perhaps be traced back to the 
perplexing legacy of Judge Anzilotti’s distinction between ‘essential and non-essential grounds’.50 
The distinction has been made far more often by individual judges, but it is submitted that inconsistencies 
in their observations make it difficult to establish a shared institutional understanding. That having been 
                                               
46 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p.43, 
47 Ibid. at 53, para 126. 
48 For an up-to-date review of the problems associated with the principle, see Niccolò Ridi, ‘Precarious Finality? Reflections on 
Res Judicata and the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Case’ [2018] Leiden Journal of International Law 
1. 
49  Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at 23, para 28. Application for Revision and Interpretation of the 
Judgment of 24 Februaiy 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 192, at 220, para 51; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports 1992, p. 350, at 401, para 252; Request for an Examination of the 
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s  Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. 
France) Case, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 288 At 294-5, para 22; Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the 
Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/ Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (El Salvador v. 
Honduras), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 392, at 403, para 33. 
50 Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzow), 1927, PCIJ, Series A, No. 13, p. 2, at 24. 
The ratio / obiter distinction, according to international adjudicators 
 
11 
said, the technique is quite common. For example, Judge Spender interestingly imported the distinction 
in the context of advisory jurisdiction in Certain Expenses,51 arguing that statements made in the 
Competence of the ILO Opinion, delivered by the PCIJ, were not to be relied on because they were made 
after ‘the Court had already arrived at its conclusion’.52And yet, judges from different traditions see obiter 
observations differently. Judge Cançado Trinidade, too, has qualified them as statements supporting the 
ratio to be included for reasons of exhaustiveness. Judge Owada has objected to the use of the 
Mavrommatis dictum, not as such, bus because of the Court’s worrisome practice of elaborating upon it 
too creatively. Other times yet, a close reading of the decisions seems to reveal that these terms ay have 
been used in a rather imprecise manner. Absence of evidence notoriously does not amount to evidence of 
absence, but it does seem difficult to argue that the ratio/obiter distinction carries much weight in the 
Court’s case law.  
Apparent contradictions, of course, exist. The legacy of the Permanent Court’s Opinion in Eastern Carelia 
is an interesting example. As is well known, the case is generally understood to establish the principle that 
advisory opinions may not be used in such a way that would circumvent states’ consent. However, it has 
also been contented that the central and ultimate ground for the decision stroke directly at the lack of 
competence of the Council of the League of Nations to request an opinion involving a state that was not 
a member of the League itself.53 The point was used as a matter of critical distinction for the disapplication 
of Eastern Carelia in the Namibia Opinion. Indeed, a common, and more modern,54 reading of Eastern 
Carelia is that membership to the Council of the League would have been sufficient, in any case, for the 
Court to issue an opinion.55 Though the relationship between these two cases may look like a suitable 
example, the grounds for the refusal of the Carelia opinion and the principle it established—namely, 
membership of the League and consent to the Court’s jurisdiction—were substantially one and the same, 
though formally distinct. The contradiction discussed here, therefore, remains apparent: it is but an 
instance of a Court’s dictum clarifying the principle applied in the case, and the story of the subsequent 
interpretation of its import. 
B. Investment arbitration: Everything counts? 
Speaking of ratio and obiter has been more common in international investment arbitration. Specifically, 
there are at least 59 decisions that mention the distinction. In a landmark empirical article on the legal 
reasoning of ICSID tribunals, Fauchald observed that the arbitrators appeared to be relatively impervious 
to arguments based on the distinction.56 The situation is somewhat different now in that mentions are 
even more common, but there does not seem to be a major difference in the treatment of statements made 
obiter. In Berschader v. Russia,57 an SCC Tribunal could discuss the Plama precedent saying that  
                                               
51 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion. 20 July 1962 [1962] ICJ 
Reports 151. 
52 Certain Expenses, supra n51, at 192-3 (Dissenting Opinion of Juge Spender). 
53 See the discussion in Ole Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: The Rise of 
the International Judiciary (Cambridge University Press 2005) 160 ff. 
54 Beyond Namibia, the point is expressed clearly in Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at 15. 
55 Spiermann (n 53) 172–3. 
56 Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 301, 315. 
57 Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. Russian Federation, Case No. 080 2004, Award, 21 April 2006. 
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Since the Tribunal had already upheld its jurisdiction under the ECT, the tribunal’s decision with respect to its 
jurisdiction under the BIT was essentially obiter dicta. The issues discussed by the Tribunal in relation thereto are, 
however, of direct relevance in the instant case.58  
This conclusion was found wanting by Arbitrator Weiler in his dissent, where he declared that the 
precedent should have been deemed ‘not persuasive because the reasoning was not dispositive of the final 
award’.59 Six years later, the Burlington v. Ecuador tribunal cautiously endorsed the respondent’s view that 
‘everything counts’.60 The tribunal restated its belief of having a duty to harmoniously contribute to the 
development of international law and promote a predictable legal order and that 
In this light, there is no reason to distinguish between obiter dicta and holding. Whether peripheral or central to the 
decision, the statements of an international investment tribunal may provide guidance to investors and host States alike, 
and may serve to predict the decisions of future tribunals.61  
The Caratube II tribunal dealt with yet another problem, that is to say, the weight to be given to the 
determinations of the Caratube I tribunal.62 The claimants had insisted that the tribunal in the new claim 
should not be bound by determinations made obiter by previous one.63 The question, however, straddled 
the distinction between the issue of precedent and that of res judicata, ultimately the basis of the problem 
as resolved by the tribunal.64 Perhaps one of the most paradigmatic endorsements to date is to be found in 
the jurisdictional phase of Murphy Exploration v Ecuador, where the tribunal stated quite vocally that 
Claimant’s dismissive attitude towards an incidental statement was not justified and found that ‘the Enron 
tribunal wanted to include that statement in its Decision precisely because of the importance it attributed 
to the issue’, even if it was not an essential and dispositive one.65 
Instances to the contrary conclusion do exist, though it is often difficult to ascertain if the quality of obiter 
alone was enough to determine unpersuasiveness. By way of example, in European American Investment 
Bank v. Slovak Republic,66 the value of Berschader as a precedent was curtly dismissed, because ‘the relevant 
part of the award is obiter and contains no reasoning not set out in the other awards reviewed above’.67 In 
the Yukos final award the Tribunal observed that it agreed with the proposition ‘that the principle that an 
investment “will not be protected if it has been created in violation of national or international principles 
of good faith” or “of the host State’s law” is a general principle’. Yet, the statement was overtly extracted by 
what ‘other arbitral tribunals have stated in obiter dicta’.68 Remarkably, in the next page the tribunal went 
on dismiss the authorities cited by respondent because they ‘were all made obiter and are too vague to 
                                               
58 Ibid. at para 171. 
59 Ibid., dissenting opinion of Professor Todd Weiler, para. 19. 
60 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012. 
61 Ibid at para 221. 
62 Caratube International Oil Company LLP and Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, 
Award, 27 September 2017. 
63 Id at para 362. 
64 Ibid at para 458-60. 
65 Murphy Exploration and Production Company International v. Republic of Ecuador [I], ICSID Case No. ARB 08 4, Award on 
Jurisdiction, 15 December 2010, para 153. 
66 European American Investment Bank AG (Austria) v. Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2010-17, Award on Jurisdiction, 22 
October 2012. 
67 Ibid at para 384 (emphasis added). 
68 Ibid at para 1351. 
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allow any certain conclusions to be drawn as to their intended meaning.69 One of the most negative 
attitudes towards incidental statements can be found in Quasar de Valors v Russia,70 where the tribunal 
remarked—the reader will note the conceptual and terminological similarity with the observations of Jan 
Paulsson, who happened to be on the tribunal—as follows: 
[t]here are other reasons why alleged precedents may be of limited normative applicability. Quotations of incidental 
comments are not entitled to be considered as precedents at all; they are not part of the ratio decidendi and thus are not 
part of the reasoning by which the arbitrators fulfil their mandate to decide. That is where they exercise personal 
responsibility. Obiter dicta are commentary. They may be persuasive but are a priori of less weight.71 
Irrespective of whether or not the inclusion of dicta is a good or bad thing in investment decision, their use 
is remarkably difficult to sanction within the system. In the Lucchetti annulment proceedings, for example, 
claimant had taken issue with an ‘inappropriate and irrelevant’ statement made by the tribunal.72 The 
Committee took the view that it could not be sanctioned, precisely because it was pronounced obiter.73 The 
apparent paradox is that the very fact that a pronouncement is made obiter deprives it from any authority 
in the instant case, simultaneously making it irrelevant in the solution of the dispute and shielding it from 
any potential censure. 
The framework of annulment may be taken to offer a second interesting insight into the question of the 
relevance of dicta. Under the ICSID rules, it is well understood that the annulment committees do not 
perform a function of appellate review, only being empowered to censure the impugned award on narrow 
and rigorously specified grounds,74 being concerned with the legitimacy of the process, rather than the 
formal correctness of the award.75 It is, however, equally well known that many annulment committees 
have taken the scenic route to exercising this power. By doing so, they have commented extensively on 
errors in law that could not, under the ICSID framework, lead by themselves to annulment. In some cases, 
the acknowledgement of the alleged legal irrelevance of the pronouncement on these issues has gone hand 
in hand with a strong emphasis on the magnitude of the mistakes that were made in the impugned award. 
The well-known example of the CMS annulment proceedings may be recalled at this point: the ad hoc 
Committee abode by the statutory guidelines in refraining from annulling the award on the grounds of its 
mistaken analysis of the necessity defence. Yet, it did not withhold some remarkably harsh comments on 
the matter, concluding that if it ‘was acting as a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award on 
                                               
69 Ibid at para 1356. 
70 Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A. and others (formerly Renta 4 S.V.S.A and others) v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24 2007, 
Award on Preliminary Objections, 20 March 2009. 
71 Ibid at para 91. 
72 Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. The Republic of Peru, Decision on Annulment, para 115. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See, for example, the Annulment Committee in M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/6, Decision on Annulment, 19 October 2009, opining that ‘[i]t is an overarching principle that ad hoc 
committees are not entitled to examine the substance of the award but are only allowed to look at the award insofar as the list 
of grounds contained in Article 52 of the Washington Convention requires’. On unpacking these grounds see generally 
Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, Annulment of ICSID Awards (Juris Publishing, Inc 2004); R Doak Bishop and Silvia M 
Marchili, Annulment under the ICSID Convention (OUP Oxford 2012); Gabriel Bottini, ‘Present and Future of ICSID 
Annulment: The Path to an Appellate Body?’ (2016) 31 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 712. 
75 David D Caron, ‘Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between 
Annulment and Appeal’ (1992) 7 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 21, 24. 
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this ground’.76 It would be utterly naïve to suppose that a statement by a committee comprised of two 
former ICJ Judges—one being a former president—and the Special Rapporteur for the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility could, whatever its lack of formal value, go without legacy. Stone Sweet and Grisel 
cogently argue that this was, indeed, not the case at all, as the Committee’s dicta were widely referred to in 
subsequent annulment proceedings,77 and eventually resulted in the ‘destruction’ of the entire ‘Orrego 
Vicuña approach’.78 
To sum up, arbitral practice seems to care little for the distinction. This is so in the case of both other 
previous awards and, remarkably, annulment proceedings, with the result that the scope of their review 
becomes significantly broader than the statutory framework would suggest. 
C. WTO Adjudication 
As mentioned above, dicta are especially political in WTO adjudication, and the object of express 
condemnation by WTO members. One of the most critical problems in this regard is that the Appellate 
Body itself appears to employ the notion. 
The Appellate Body mentioned the distinction in a number of cases. In Canada – Periodicals it expressly 
qualified a statement made by a GATT Panel to the effect that ‘it can reasonably be assumed that a 
payment not made directly to producers is not made “exclusively” to them’. The Appellate Body qualified 
this statement as obiter, because ‘the panel found in that report that subsidies paid to oilseeds processors 
were not made “exclusively to domestic producers”’. This is an interesting case, because it shows the full 
force of a strong version of the ratio / obiter distinction: since a decision on the first point (whether the 
payments had been made to domestic producers exclusively) had been taken, any decision on the second 
(whether a non-direct payment can ever be made exclusively to the receiver) was necessarily incidental 
and unnecessary—in other words, obiter.79  
Another interesting example may be found in Argentina – Textiles, where the Appellate Body had an 
opportunity to assess the Panel’s reliance on a number of GATT panel reports which persuaded it that 
past GATT practice on the question of whether Article II of the GATT 1994 allowed a Member to apply 
a type of duty other than that provided for in that Member's Schedule was ‘clear’. The Appellate Body 
dismantled this argument by demonstrating that the issue before the panels in the quoted precedents was 
not quite the same. As one report in particular contained wording that seemed suggestive of an opposite 
solution, the Appellate Body felt the need to distinguish the case and supported this reasoning by engaging 
with it in a footnote, further qualifying such statements as dicta. 
                                               
76 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 25 September 2007, para 135. 
77 Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 02 16, Decision on the Argentine Republic's 
Application for Annulment of the Award, 29 June 2010, paras 176, 197, 213-214; Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly 
Enron Corporation) and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 01 3, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 30 July 2010, para 405. 
78 Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel, The Evolution of International Arbitration: Judicialization, Governance, Legitimacy (Oxford 
University Press 2017) 163. 
79 In this connection, I am inclined to respectfully disagree with Henry Gao, who interprets this decision as not clarifying why 
the point was dictum: see Henry Gao, ‘Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes’ [2018] World Trade Review 1, 21. 
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Three more cases may be of interest. In US – Gambling the Appellate Body clarified that it did not need to 
rule on an observation made by the panel when the panel itself had qualified it as not responding to a 
specific claim by any parties and qualified it as an obiter.80 The same reasoning was endorsed in EC – 
Fasteners, where the Appellate Body qualified the Panel’s statement that ‘that there was an inconsistency 
in the European Union's arguments’ as an ‘obiter dictum that had no material bearing on its ultimate 
conclusion that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement’.81 Finally, in Chile – Price Band System82 the Appellate Body considered the propriety of 
making a dictum on dicta.83 The panel had itself qualified as dictum its observation to the effect that ‘an 
Article 21.5 compliance panel may consider a new claim, not raised before the original panel’. The parties 
to the proceedings disagreed as to whether the issue should have been addressed. Australia and the United 
States advocated a narrow reviewing power, whereas Canada and the European Communities were in 
favour of a broad understanding of the role of the Appellate Body, which could have resolved an issue of 
systemic importance, thus contributing to increased legal certainty.84 Eventually, however, the Appellate 
Body chose to avoid the issue by virtue of its refusal to address Argentina’s conditional appeal, within the 
context of which the issue had been raised.85 
D. An interim conclusion 
The analysis carried out above shows that there is no real consistency in the understanding of the role and 
significance of obiter dicta in international adjudication. So far, no international tribunal has spelled out a 
general approach to the issue. Rather, it seems that, in most cases, the distinction is employed 
argumentatively to undermine claims or the value of legal propositions, or to avoid a decision that may 
prove controversial, but without any systematic approach. It must be noted that, especially in systems 
where a rule of binding precedent does operate, creative use of the distinction between ratio and obiter 
may be instrumental in occasioning progressive shifts in the development of the law: a wholesale rejection 
of an approach that modulates its borders is thus not warranted. Yet, it does not appear from the analysis 
above that it is with this intention that international adjudicators approach this issue, which remains 
problematically unsystematised. It is with this in mind that the following section provides additional 
elements for a more critically grounded approach to the distinction. 
IV. A different outlook: Life in the realm of the text 
Traditional accounts on ratio and obiter do not fare well when contrasted with the current practice of 
international courts and tribunals. This section considers alternative heuristics which may provide a more 
satisfactory explanatory framework. 
                                               
80 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R, circulated 20 August 2007, para 131. 
81 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China 
- Recourse to article 21.5 of the DSU by China, WT/DS397/AB/RW, circulated 18 January 2016, para 5.64. 
82Appellate Body Report, Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products - Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/RW, circulated 07 May 2007. 
83 I borrow this evocative expression from Gao (n 79). 
84 Appellate Body Report, Chile - Price Band System (Article 21.5 - Argentina), supra n82, paras 85-118. 
85 Ibid, para 252. 
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A. The rule as used versus the rule as stated: Komárek’s distinctions between case-bound and 
legislative models of precedent 
Let us go back to Jennings. For all his criticism, the Mavrommatis querelle only shows that there is another 
way to address the issue. Consider, as an example, the argument from consistency for precedential 
constraint. Is it like cases that should be decided alike, or is it rather the same legal questions that should be 
similarly resolved? The distinction is not normally made in analytical jurisprudence because of the levels 
of abstraction that characterize the discipline, but it is material to most real-life applications of precedent. 
There can be little argument that in the example discussed above, relating to the notion of investment, a 
finding that the claim may be entertained based on the satisfaction of the so-called double-barrelled test 
will require the careful application of the relevant rules to the facts of the case. The same may be said of a 
finding that the claim failed on leg of the test, while satisfying the other.  
Assume now that a present tribunal takes on such point as a precedent. Is the argument from consistency 
affected by the fact that the tribunal entertained, rather than dismissed, the claim? It is submitted that it is 
not—indeed, why should it?86 The possibility of it being an inappropriate use of precedent is dependent 
on the rules determining its application. In this regard, Paulsson provides a useful, if perhaps involuntary, 
comparison between the statements made in the Saipem award with that of the Apellate Body in Stainless 
Steel.87 One speaks of a duty to adopt ‘solutions established in a series of consistent cases’, whereas the other, 
quoting the first, refers to one to ‘resolve the same legal question in the same way’. Accepting this 
admittedly fragile semantic distinction, it is not difficult to see that the decision on a legal question may 
very well not be decisive for the solution of a case. A similar line of reasoning was followed in Judgement 
No. 333, where the Court qualified a passage of the judgment to be reviewed as an obiter. In his landmark 
study on precedent, Shahabuddeen takes the statement as evidence of the fact that the Court is capable of 
drawing the distinction, but—crucially—omits to comment on the fact that it went on to say that the 
qualification of a statement by the UN Administrative Tribunal as obiter did not ‘affect the duty of the 
Court to consider whether this ground of objection is or is not well founded’.88 To be sure, the Court was 
giving an advisory opinion, and functioning almost as an appellate jurisdiction with a broad mandate to 
establish whether the Tribunal erred ‘on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter’—a 
point that the Court interpreted as including any element addressed in the decision, whether dispositive 
in its effect or not.89 But it is possible to find in this approach support for the proposition made above. In 
other words, statements made obiter do not have less legal importance. They are, at the very least, indicia 
                                               
86 Compare this point with the discussion in Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012. It is quite possible that the choice for a narrow view of holdings may have been 
inspired by the general understanding of the scope of the res judicata principle in jurisdictional matters. Consider, for example, 
the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 6, at 261. (‘The 
effect of res judicata concerning a judgment on jurisdictional matters must be confined to the point of the existence or otherwise 
of the Court's jurisdiction.’) See also Judge Morelli’s dissent in the same case (at 59). 
87 Saipem SpA. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award, 30 June 2009, para 90; Appellate Body 
Report, US – Stainless Steel, WT/DS344/AB/R, 30 April 2008, para 160. 
88 Application for Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1987, 
51, para 86. 
89 Judge Schwebel, however, dissented on the grounds that the Court had allegedly failed to do so: see Application for Review of 
Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1987, 51, at 109-110 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel). 
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that a court will resolve that legal question in the same or a similar manner in the future—all the more 
reason for the Court to review the correctness of the solution.  
The reality is not—rather, not simply—that the distinction between ratio and obiter is difficult to justify 
in international adjudication for a lack of positive sources mandating it. The problem is that it is also 
difficult to draw, and ultimately bound to get diluted in the argumentative process consummated before 
and within the subsequent adjudicator, which will, whatever the precedent court might have done to avoid 
misunderstandings, provide its own reconstruction of what amounts to ratio or obiter, not being bound 
by even the most expression qualification.90 It is doubtful that canons of statutory constructions may be 
readily applicable to precedents.91 In these regards, Komárek’s theory of reasoning with previous decisions 
provides a useful frame of reference.92 In his view, 
[l]awyers (judges and lawyers alike) often use judicial decisions in a way that resembles reasoning based on legislated 
texts. The idealized common law theory views that practice with suspicion and fails to acknowledge its legitimate place 
among the methods of legal reasoning.93 
Acording to Komárek, the application of the categories of the common law to the much broader question 
of the use of previous decisions overlooks the fact that there exists no methodological monopoly on the 
issue. And, indeed, it is possible for courts to approach the issue of precedent in a different way, both in 
the backward-looking and the forward-looking dimensions of precedent. In the former, the attention shifts 
from the rule as applied to the rule as stated. In the latter, the drafting of a decision effects and encourages—
but does not necessarily mandate—the future use of precedents as almost-statutory material by the 
adoption of rather abstracts language and a less precise focus on the facts of a case.94 What a court says has 
the potential for universalization.95 
A comparison with the Italian legal system, which offers a different approach altogether, may also be of 
assistance. The Suprema Corte di Cassazione enjoys very limited control on its docket—certainly nothing 
akin to a jus of certiorari—and deals yearly with some tens of thousands of cases, compared with the eighty 
or so opinions delivered by the US Supreme Court in the same time frame. To make matters more 
complicated, it is split in different sezioni, each managing qualitatively different caseloads and often 
overlapping in competence. To preserve its ‘nomofilactic’ role, an office exists at the Court whose function 
is to examine the overwhelming amount judgments delivered yearly and extract the ‘maxim’ (massima) 
that they are based on. Note that a ‘maxim’ is not the same thing as a headnote, and most certainly is not 
the same thing as a ratio: rather, it can be extracted from all elements of a decision, so long that they can be 
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91 Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth (Butterworths 1985) 123 ff. 
92 Komárek (n 17). 
93 ibid 170. 
94 ibid 158–9. 
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universalised in an abstract rule.96 To be sure, the Cassazione’s nomofilactic function finds specific support 
in Italian law,97 and its hierarchical supremacy and embeddedness in a unified judicial system may provide 
additional grounds in support of this specific role.98 There may also be something to be said, it is 
acknowledged, about the mediating function of the Ufficio del Massimario, which might easily be 
denounced as glorified academic commentary or codification unshackled from the bounds of the judicial 
function. Yet, though many an objection could be levelled by a common lawyer, this imperfect analogy 
need only serve to illustrate that it is indeed possible to find guidance, and even normative authority, in prior 
decisions without being overly drawn to the ratio/obiter distinction. 
B. Ratio and obiter as convenient argumentative and justificatory devices 
And yet, separating ratio and obiter is convenient for at least one reason: the leeway that it provides for the 
act of distinguishing. As mentioned above, distinguishing is a paradigmatic example of a manifestation of 
power—a proper claim to independent and separate normative authority—masquerading as 
unobjectionable intellectual exercise.99 To the extent that precedents may create or reproduce something 
having certain features of abstract legal rules,100 confining this capacity to rationes is an effective way to 
limit this tendency, at least at the quantitave level.  When there is a rule of practice mandating adherence 
to precedent, such an approach may not surprise. When adherence to precedent is predicated on its 
persuasiveness, the argument is not convincing. In international law, where the use of previous decisions 
follows—rectius: it is purported to follow—a specific type of regulation under the model of Article 
38(1)(d), the approach enjoys even less cogency. 
The truth, one may be inclined to conclude, is that a plea for the application of the ratio/obiter distinction 
is not so much a failure to understand approaches different from one’s own tradition,101 but rather no more 
than a rhetorical and argumentative device employed to undermine the value of an authoritative 
statement. It is in this light that one of Shabtai Rosenne’s recommendation to international lawyers, 
advising that the ‘absence from international law of any rule of stare decisis means that the lawyer should 
be careful before relying on its ancillary doctrine of the distinction between the ratio decidendi and any 
                                               
96 Michele Taruffo and Massimo La Torre, ‘Precedent in Italy’ in Neil MacCormick and Robert S Summers (eds), Interpreting 
Precedents: A Comparative Study (Ashgate/Dartmouth 1997) 147–8; For a more thorough discussion, see Michele Taruffo, 
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1995) 20. 
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obiter dicta’,102 may be understood. Unpacking the rather dense statement, the question is not one of 
doctrine, but one of rules of relevance and authority—provided, of course, that they exist.103  
Naturally, one could start from the assumption that prior decisions are simply neither binding nor 
(necessarily) persuasive. Yet, even overlooking normative indications that the application of precedent is 
not at all optional, this would amount to throwing out the baby with the bath water, as the argumentative 
value of precedent would be entirely lost. In short, this is but a ‘convenient distinction’,104 one that allows 
for having it both ways. It is not, however, a costless one: once introduced, it becomes part of the 
argumentative vocabulary of dispute settlement by—and, most importantly, before—the adjudicator. In 
other words, it allows an adjudicator’s constituency to criticize it with its own techniques.105 
C. Against judicial minimalism: Positive externalities of dicta 
Mentions of judicial minimalism frequently recur in the discussion of the international judicial function. 
To restate the argument, the idea is that a minimal decision will ward off fears of judicial overreach, and 
will also be less likely to offer a pretext for activist judges in the future. (The latter point, with respect, 
sounds like the ‘they dress provocatively’ argument.) The fact remains, however, that there is quite a lot to 
be said about the positive externalities of an exhaustive judicial decision. 
Indeed, judicial minimalism often appears to be as a paradigmatic example of false economy. Similar views 
have been advanced in individual opinions of ICJ judges. Judge Lauterpacht observed in Norwegian Loans 
that though ‘[t]here may be force and attraction in the view that among a number of possible solutions a 
court of law ought to select that which is most simple, most concise and most expeditious… such 
considerations are not, for this Court, the only legitimate factor in the situation’.106 The passage was 
quoted and endorsed in Judge Gaja’s declaration in Marshall Islands: in his view, the fact that the Court 
had decided, having dismissed the Applicant’s case on the grounds that there was no dispute, to avoid 
pronouncing on the other objections raised by the respondent States was a false application of judicial 
economy. As he put it, ‘judicial economy may also require the Court to take a decision on certain issues 
that were raised by the respondent States and which are likely to have to be litigated again in new 
proceedings between the same Parties, when these proceedings are a distinct possibility’. In a similar vein, 
a far more minimalist adjudicator such as the WTO Appellate Body has argued against ‘false judicial 
economy’, espousing a view that places emphasis not just on the resolution of a dispute, but on the positive 
resolution of a dispute, a goal to be accomplished by enabling the DSB ‘to make sufficiently precise 
recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those 
recommendations and rulings… to the benefit of all Members’. 
A second point that should be considered is the potential that dicta have as a channel of communication 
between a judicial body and its constituency. This is not the general reading of the practice of issuing dicta, 
but it is a legitimate one. As an example, it is possible to follow Fuad Zarbiyev’s reading of the Barcelona 
Traction dictum on erga omnes obligations, which, though wholly unnecessary to the resolution of the case, 
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was likely envisaged—at least partly—as a response to societal preoccupations in the wake of the rather 
unpopular 1966 South-West Africa Judgment.107 Similar considerations could easily be applied to the 
Court’s dictum in Arrest Warrant, where it was stressed, though ultimately without consequence for the 
operative part of the judgment, that ‘immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have 
committed, irrespective of their gravity’.108 
Finally, there is the question of law-making. The idea that international courts and tribunals can and do 
make law is not really open to challenge in academic circles—the difference in various lines of reasoning 
can be measured in the number of indirect steps to be taken to reach the very same conclusion—, although 
it is certainly true that the process is less automatic in some cases than some approaches would have us 
believe.109 Although international lawyers generally scorn the idea of judicial legislation, they are usually 
appreciative of the idea of judicial development, a term with a long history and many meanings.110 Leaving 
aside the many learned discussions on this point, the point to be considered is that the immediate effect 
of a judicial decision binding two parties and published is to resonate in front a specific audience and clarify 
the law for all. This point is particularly significant when it is considered in the context of situations where 
occasioning legal change—or even obtaining a binding interpretation of the law—can be particularly 
complex: any agreement has the potential to be better than no agreement, and the clarification of rules has 
measurable economic benefits for all actors.111 In the WTO context, it is remarkable that comparatively 
few voices should have highlighted the rather strong textual argument present in Article 3.2 of the DSU: 
‘The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law’.112 
In this context, it is, once again, clear that dicta have as much potential to shape the law as do rationes—or 
even more. The first reason is that obiter statements lend themselves to greater abstraction and generality 
and tend to have a more rule-like quality, cosmetically a well as substantively—an aspect that will be 
discussed in the next section. The second follows from the fact that things have a tendency to become 
more disturbing when they have actual implications. Dicta, as discussed, run parallel to the reasoning 
occasioning the decision, but can be dispensed with if need be, and are not easy to challenge in annulment 
or appeal proceedings precisely because they are not decisive. 
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D. Textualization and decontextualization of international precedent 
Decisive or not, these statements survive: they become text. Recall the evolution of the theory of precedent 
in England: the declaratory theory and the rise of positivism went hand in hand. One may think of Lord 
Mansfied’s observations that ‘[t]he reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular 
precedents’,113 or Blackstone’s partition of the law of England in lex scripta (statute law) and lex non scripta 
(custom and common law),114 does bear some degree of similarity In landmark article, the late Peter 
Tiersma voiced his scepticism as to whether the distinction could still apply after centuries of law 
reporting, and further observed that American law—but there are reasons to apply the claim beyond 
specific borders: is international customary law not the paradigmatic example of a norme sans texte?115—
was becoming increasingly ‘textualized’—that is to say, hinging on what judges wrote, rather than what 
they thought, or said during the proceeding.116 He observed that, in most cases, ‘the judge writing for the 
majority will often specify exactly what the holding is in carefully crafted text that is meant to fetter the 
discretion of lower courts in the same way that a statute does’. This change had significant consequences, 
including the replacement, actual or at least potential, of legal reasoning with close reading and, most 
specifically, the shift from a system of case law to a system of ‘opinion law’.117 Tiersma made a few 
examples: verbatim repetition of specific expressions; string citations; specific signalling of holdings; overt 
codification of rules, and their naming after ‘very brief snippets of authoritative text’.118 Though he focused 
on American law, there is no doubt that these examples will sound familiar to anyone who engages in the 
analysis of the decisions of international adjudicators. 
1. Textualization: Who, when, and why it matters 
Textualization tells us something about the perception of the authority of international adjudicators. On 
the self-reflective level, this is about international adjudicators writing and using judgments. For other 
actors, this is about using judgments argumentatively. Think of international lawyers—from budding 
ones writing a midterm paper to academics, counsel, and clerks of senior international judges—engaged 
in the daily practice of mining an online database to find support for a proposition in a judgment that so 
conveniently states their vesting it with the officiality of judicial authority.119 Although international 
lawyers’ fascination for the words of international judges is, in and by itself, one of the key drivers of the 
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textualization phenomenon,120 the point is that for many actors it has become much easier to attach 
importance to the text, rather than the outcome of a case. Comparing the Oxford Reports on International 
Law (or the EUR-Lex database) and Stuyt’s Survey of International Arbitrations,121 it becomes apparent that 
stress on outcome, rather than reasoning—or text—makes it difficult to find one quotable soundbite.122 
The facility with which text can be accessed removes some of the risks traditionally associated with 
‘headnote positivism’, but it does import new ones.  
The worship of the text—or ‘textolatry’123—amplifies the ouroboric dimension of the relationship 
between a permanent court and its constituency. The text, not the finding, is the best instrument to 
advance their claim to normative authority. The malleability of texts—the judgment—and events—the 
resolution of a dispute—differs by orders of magnitude. The interpretation of facts encounters harder 
limits than that of texts, especially when there exists identity (even as a matter of degree) between the 
author of the text and the actor that must rely on it. In the case of international courts and tribunals, the 
control on the text, already inherent in authorship,124 is also amplified by the circumstance that they alone 
are entitled to interpret their output,125 while—contrary to the case of, say, treaty or statutory 
interpretation—there is a shortage of interpretive canons concerning judgments. 
It may be recalled that Ingo Venzke’s application of semantic pragmatism to the practice of international 
courts and tribunals reaches similar conclusions.126 It is through words, not deeds, that courts can advance 
their semantic authority: clearly such advancement can come about through the interpretation of a treaty 
text, but this is hardly the only way to do so. Adjudicators have understood from an early phase that this 
objective was better accomplished by engaging with the past in a certain way, and, specifically, eschewing 
the idea of precedent as an example of ‘how a life situation been resolved in the past so that the case sub 
judice could matched with these examples of earlier decision making’, but rather ‘a rulelike 
pronouncement of higher authority, the facts of the case stripped to their shadows’.127 Indeed, as the 
following subsection demonstrates, this is how precedents are most commonly cited by international 
adjudicators. Fitzmaurice’s observation that ‘a decision is a fact: an opinion, however cogent, remains an 
opinion’ is thus subject to an interesting twist: the practice of international adjudicators shows that either 
facts have a little role to play or decisions are taken as ‘facts’ in their entirety.128  
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2. Pitfalls of textualism: Decontextualization 
The problem is that one such approach does not come without dangers, the most significant being 
decontextualization. Consider the following example: a mathematician writing on the topic of boundary 
functions finds support for a proposition in the 1960s papers of a Ted Kaczynski. Should she acknowledge 
the fact that the author is the ‘Unabomber’? If she does not, it can be said that she is removing the 
context—or, at least, a context. Though this context should not bear any relevance on the argument she 
wishes to make, even if, from the perspective of argumentation, it can be problematic because of the idea 
that ‘[e]vil associations jeopardize relics’,129 and the leeway it gives for a reductio ad hitlerum 
counterargument.130 Consider, next, the use of string quotations by creationists. There exists a whole 
strand of literature that engages with and exposes the methodologies of pseudoscience. Starting with 
Dobzhansky’s 1973 landmark essay, a number of works by evolution-deniers have been found to hinge on 
the careful juxtaposition of quotations that, once isolated by their context, can support their claim.131 In this 
case, decontextualization is much more underhanded. By doing so, creationists manage force the text 
enough to provide a solid basis for an argument from authority—and, what matters most, an authority 
that their opponent respect. This amounts to a brazen logical fallacy, one of misrepresented authority.132 
Consider, in this light, the common criticism levelled at the European Court of Justice for its tendency to 
casually add a number of string references confirming the validity of settled law, ritualistically repeat 
formulae without connecting them to the facts of the case, and only very rarely engage with precedents 
substantively.133 The ECJ has been further criticised for creating propositions and formulae by juxtaposing 
quotations taken liberally from previous judgments as if they were LEGO bricks.134 Note that such 
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practices are not unique to any court,135 nor are they the exclusive purchase of adjudicators, being rather 
common in the arguments of those who plead before them.136 
It is not the intention of the present writer to compare the ECJ to either the Unabomber or evolution-
deniers. Yet, even if the practice is not abused, the point remains that relying on string citations does not 
provide maximum clarity as to the scope and effect of the precedent cited.137 It is a legitimacy-enhancing 
device, but a relatively shallow one, establishing—at best—a rebuttable presumption of correctness,138 
but also likely to undermine the very persuasiveness of a decision by reducing it to an instance of that 
‘tonsorial and agglutinative’ writing with which Cardozo so often took issue.139 Above all, it can also 
engender unease and confusion for the parties, who are left to deal with the consequences of the decision 
without having been given, if not only formally, reasons that would qualify as truly satisfactory if Lord 
Bingham’s criteria were to be strictly applied.140 String citations and scant engagement not just with the 
past, but with its meaning, may reveal an eisegetic approach to the justification of a legal claim. Ultimately, 
it is but another channel to assert normative authority. 
This approach is problematic for a number of reasons, and may be especially ill-advised when it comes to 
international adjudication because it does not start from an overly realistic understanding of how 
collegiate bodies take their decisions,141 especially in conflicted cases where these are ultimately drafted by 
‘shifting groups of judges representing shifting majorities’ and the motifs are but the result of 
compromise.142 Greater care might be needed, as text sticks from the very moment it is let out, and may 
only with difficulty be put it back in the box: the jurisprudence of the ICJ on questions of interpretation or 
res judicata, with all the difficulties arising from the difficulty of deciding what has been decided, is 
testament to significance of this concern.  
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3. Empirically testing the shift to textualization 
How can we properly assess the shift to textualization? In the author’s recollection, no study specifically 
attempted to test such kind of propositions. The closest attempt, in all likeness, is Sadl and Panagis’s effort 
to empirically assess the whether the European Court of Justice treated precedents as a constraining force 
or, quite the opposite, as an argumentative springboard for change, building on the well-known 
Dworkinian distinction between the ‘gravitational’ and ‘enactment’ force of precedent.143 In brief, the 
former is about the underlying principle of the precedent decision, which explains its ability to control 
merely analogous cases, on the formal justice-imbued basis that like case should be treated alike;144 the 
second is about the words used in a given precedent, which can thus only control what falls in the linguistic 
purchase of the words it uses.145 A similar approach is adopted here: this section focuses on the most cited 
cases and paragraphs in the jurisprudence of two adjudicators, the ICJ and the WTO Appellate Body, in 
order to assess the extent to which they might demonstrate these citation patterns may support the claims 
made above. 
It may be helpful to briefly summarise the approach adopted here. The availability of large collections of 
text allows for the quick parsing of all the paragraphs containing a citation. By using regular expressions,146 
it is possible to extract them and categorise them using a data structure that places them in context, 
matching any paragraph with the decision that contains it and the ones it cites, down to the specific 
paragraph or paragraphs that are mentioned, and with a reasonable degree of accuracy. When this 
methodology is applied to the ICJ and the WTO Appellate Body, it is possible to identify the most cited 
paragraphs cited by the two bodies, comparing their characteristics and tracking their use. 
                                               
143 RM Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 110–123. 
144 ibid 116. 
145 Dworkin justifies the distinction (also) on the basis that only the gravitational force of precedent is based on the fairness of 
treating like cases alike. In the present author’s view, the most useful critique to that argument is to be found in David Pannick, 
‘A Note on Dworkin and Precedent’ (1980) 43 The Modern Law Review 36. 
146 These expressions are designed to match a ‘pattern’ and vary depending on the specific needs. For example, the ICJ tends to 
identify the cited decisions with a fairly consistent pattern, which includes, inter alia, the names of the disputing parties and the 
year and page of the reports in which they are published. In some cases, however, the Court makes observations between the 
name of the case and its citation in the reporter. Accordingly, the choice was made to collect only the latter. The most commonly 




By way of comparison, for the Appellate Body, after converting official document numbers and full citations into short names, 
several regexes were employed, the structure being similar to what follows: 
 




For the use of similar methodologies, see Urska Sadl and Ioannis Panagis, ‘The Force of EU Case Law: An Empirical Study of 
Precedential Constraint’ (Social Science Research Network 2016) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2787119 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2787119> accessed 24 March 2018; Wolfgang Alschner and Damien Charlotin, ‘The 
Growing Complexity of the International Court of Justice’s Self-Citation Network’ (2018) 29 European Journal of 
International Law 83.  
A different outlook: Life in the realm of the text 
 
26 
Table 1: Appellate Body – The most cited paragraphs and Table 2: ICJ – The most cited paragrahps 
below, provide some answers. First, they show that both the Appellate Body and the ICJ have a marked 
tendency to rely on previous decisions for questions related on their procedure and, in general, their 
functioning. This point, in turn, may suggest an explanation for the second finding, which confirms that 
both the ICJ and the Appellate Body tend to use precedent in a rather ‘textual’ manner, employing 
prefabricated, tested formulations as argumentative building blocks and stringing them together in their 
output. This point is shown, with even greater clarity, by looking at how particular paragraphs have been 
treated over time. Two examples, taken from a much larger analysis, clearly show that there have been very 
few instances in which paragraph 267 of Australia – Salmon or page 74 of the Interpretation of Peace Treaties 
Advisory Opinion have been cited without a verbatim quotation. 
There may be very good reasons for this approach. First of all, there are some hardly-deniable 
epiphenomenal factors, starting with the need of quickly disposing of issues that are likely to arise in many, 
if not virtually all cases. The identification of these factors may ultimately boil down to the specific function 
of a court—consider the need to establish an adjudicator’s original—or appellate—jurisdiction. 
Secondly, the psychological phenomenon whereby repetition legitimizes is a well-studied one,147 and its 
effect on persuasion widely acknowledged.148 It is easy to mark a connection between one such tool and 
the institutional resolve to enhance a Court’s legitimacy. It is also possible to simply ascribe the emergence 
of one such approach to the drafting process of judgments and reports, which may rely heavily on the 
assistance of the institution’s personnel and be affected by their relentless work,149 but it is submitted that 
the conclusion remains unchanged. While this section does not propose to make sweeping claims as to 
whether international precedent has become ‘textualized’, it is submitted that the international 
adjudicators’ current practice of reasoning using previous decisions shows some symptoms that are 
consistent with one such shift.150 In other words, a very large number of precedents are used to reiterate 
and bolster the authority of specific formulations,151 rather than—or, at least, in addition to—to apply 
their outcome to a new case.   
   
                                               
147 John T Cacioppo and Richard E Petty, ‘Effects of Message Repetition and Position on Cognitive Response, Recall, and 
Persuasion.’ (1979) 37 Journal of personality and Social Psychology 97. 
148 Robert E Burnkrant and H Rao Unnava, ‘Effects of Self-Referencing on Persuasion’ (1995) 22 Journal of Consumer 
Research 17. 
149 For a discussion of the process at the ICJ see Bedjaoui (n 141); With regards to the ECJ see generally Karen McAuliffe, 
‘Precedent at the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Linguistic Aspect’ (2013) 15 Law and Language: Current Legal 
Issues 483 (discussing cultural, linguistic, and administrative factors leading to the adoption of a specific style of drafting and 
use of previous decisions). 
150 Kozel’s view of the ‘inclusive paradigm’ of precedent may also be consistent with these patterns. The idea is that ‘[c]ertain 
broad propositions that receive deference from future courts may plausibly be characterized as holdings that were logically 
necessary to the decisions that announced them’. See Kozel (n 41) 200. 
151 Consider the helpful discussion of the tertium genus of ‘catalogs’, which transcends the ‘rule and standards’ classification of 
legal commands, made by Stein and Parchomovsky (n 118) passim. 
A different outlook: Life in the realm of the text 
 
27 







1. US – WHEAT 
GLUTEN, PARA. 151 
61 31 AB's appraisal of Panel's discretion on evidence 
2. EC – FASTENERS 
(CHINA), PARA. 442 
46 16 For a claim under Article 11 of the DSU to prevail, an appellant must 
identify specific errors regarding the objectivity of the panel's assessment  
3. US – CARBON 
STEEL, PARA. 142 
35 20 AB cannot ‘base a finding of inconsistency under Article 11 simply on the 
conclusion that [it] might have reached a different factual finding from the 
one the panel reached’. 
4. EC – HORMONES, 
PARA. 132 
32 22 Determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to (that 
is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and parcel of the fact 
finding process and is, in principle, left to the discretion of a panel as the trier 
of facts. 
5. CANADA – 
AIRCRAFT, PARA. 
157 
29 9 Interpretation of the term 'benefit'. 
6. US – CARBON 
STEEL, PARA. 157 
28 10 ‘[t]he nature and extent of the evidence required to satisfy the burden of 
proof will vary from case to case’.  
7. US – CARBON 
STEEL, PARA. 127 
25 11 ‘[t]he party asserting that another party's municipal law, as such, is 
inconsistent with relevant treaty obligations bears the burden of introducing 
evidence as to the scope and meaning of such law to substantiate that 
assertion’. 
8. AUSTRALIA – 
SALMON, PARA. 267 
25 18 Compliance with the requirements of Article 6.2 must be demonstrated on 
the face of the request for the establishment of a panel. 
9. AUSTRALIA – 
SALMON, PARA. 223 
24 14 Panels ‘are not required to accord to factual evidence of the parties the same 
meaning and weight as do the parties’. 
10. EC – SARDINES, 
PARA. 299 
23 17 Article 11 affords panels a margin of discretion in their assessment of the 
facts. 
 
Table 2: ICJ – The most cited paragrahps 





1. Reports 1950, p. 74 18 18 ‘Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective 
determination' 
2. Reports 1962, p. 328 16 15 In order to show that a dispute exists 'It must be shown that the claim of one 
party is positively opposed by the other' 
3. Reports 1954, p. 32 15 11 The Court must not 'run counter to a well-established principle of 
international law embodied in the Court’s Statute, namely, that the Court 
can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent' 
4. P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, 
p. 11 
14 14 A dispute is 'a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views 
or of interests between two persons' 
5. Reports 2001, p. 506, 
para. 109 
17 17 ‘Orders on provisional measures under Article 41 [of the Statute] have 
binding effect' 
                                               
152 It must be observed that, especially in the context of WTO adjudication, paragraphs of Appellate Body reports may be quite 
lengthy and dense, with the result that more than one specific proposition may be extracted from each of them. 
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6. Reports 1993, p. 345, 
para. 42 
16 16 ‘The essential characteristic [of genocide] is the intended destruction of ‘a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group’'. 
7. Reports 1950, p. 71 12 9 Various dicta, including “[t]he Court’s Opinion is given not to the States, 
but to the organ which is entitled to request it; the reply of the Court, itself 
an ‘organ of the United Nations’, represents its participation in the activities 
of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.’ 
8. Reports 1984, p. 437, 
para. 101 
11 11 ‘ultimately ... it is the litigant seeking to establish a fact who bears the burden 
of proving it’. 
9. Reports 1962, p. 155 11 6 ‘In accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the Court can give an advisory 
opinion only on a legal question. If a question is not a legal one, the Court 
has no discretion in the matter’. 
10. Reports 1995, p. 100, 
para. 22 
11 8 [the duty of an international tribunal is] ‘not only to reply to the questions 
as stated in the final submissions of the parties, but also to abstain from 




Figure 1: The evolution of the Appellate Body's citation network until 1998, 2002, 2008, and 2017 (based on the author’s text-as-data analysis). 
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A different approach to the same problem is to focus on questions that have been expressly qualified by 
relevant actors as obiter dicta. It is tempting to start from Appellate Body Report that prompted the 
harshest blowback from the United States, Argentina – Financial Services, which was denounced for 
containing, after the reversal of the Panel’s findings on the question of likeness, 46 pages’ worth of obiter 
dicta on points that the Appellate Body itself qualified as moot. Although the case is relatively recent, it 
may be asked whether its allegedly many findings beside the point were picked up in later decisions. The 
question will have to be answered in the affirmative. The case has been cited in two subsequent Appellate 
Body Reports, which have, unsurprisingly, cited alleged dicta, down to the footnotes.153 Paragraphs beyond 
the cut-off line identified by the United States have also made it in seven panel reports.154  
Though the exercise would not be entirely pointless, it would be futile for our purposes to track the 
fortunes of any statement that may have more or less controversially qualified as dicta. What matters for 
this analysis is that it is possible to find instances in which statements on points that were demonstrably 
not necessary to the resolution of the case at issue were later relied on by the same and subordinate 
adjudicators. Once again, this tends to confirm the progressive shift towards a textualized understanding 
of precedent, which is encouraged by—and, at the same time, encourages—a degree of judicial 
maximalism. 
E. Can and should precedent be de-textualized?  
The obvious question, then, is the following: if precedent has become textualized, should it be de-
textualized? And, if so, how? As the discussion on the positive externalities on precedent made above 
clarifies, it is difficult to take a stand on the first point. But, if we are to take a stand on the second, some 
possible techniques might be worth considering.  
The first side of the coin is what to do to detextualize the production of precedents. In the study discussed 
above, Tiersma himself proposed a variety of strategies: for instance, he considered going back to the 
‘golden age’ of the common law, where law reports amounted to the revised notes jotted down in court by 
a private reporter listening to the oral proceedings, thus making future reliance on specific text unlikely. It 
is unlikely that one such system could work well in international adjudication, where private reporting of 
decisions may be restricted by a number of factors: first, it would not be as lucrative; second, it is dubious 
that registries and secretariats, which are difficult to categorise as weak powers, would relinquish control 
on the output of the adjudications they administer; third, reasons of transparency would probably hinder 
one such approach. A variation to this model would be to require international adjudicators to deliver their 
judgments (and reasons) orally in public, thus satisfying the needs of transparency and publicity,155 but 
discouraging the cult of text. This approach would perhaps strike a reasonable middle-ground between 
the current system and the one, inspired by ‘baseball arbitration’ and predicated on the lack of a duty of 
                                               
153 Specifically, the following paragraphs of Argentina – Financial Services have been cited: para. 6.203 (five times); para. 6.205, 
para. 6.203 and fn 495 (twice); para. 6.202 and fn 505 to para. 6.208 (once). 
154 For example, Panel Report, Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation Of Chicken Meat And Chicken Products, 
WT/DS484/R, adopted 17 October 2017, para 7.127. 
155 For example, through webcasting. Consider, however, the low degree of success of such methods. See Esmé Shirlow, ‘Dawn 
of a New Era? The UNCITRAL Rules and UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration’ 
(2016) 31 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 622, 653. 
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reason-giving, which Joost Pauwelyn proposed for specific classes of international disputes.156 All these 
models would have to rely on some kind of no-citation rule, as implemented in the American 
experience.157  
There is a limit, however, to the directions that can be given to an adjudicatory body. It is thus on the 
reading of precedent that the bulk of the work has to be done.  In the writer’s opinion, from the perspective 
of adjudication, there is nothing extraordinarily wrong with reliance on the text. The considerations made 
sub A will thus apply, with the caveat that close reading will need to be coupled with contextual reading. 
From the perspective of the scholars engaged in the study of the practice of international courts and 
tribunals, however, there might be reasons to adopt different approaches. The phenomenon of 
textualization provides additional support for the case against adopting an excessively doctrinal model for 
the analysis of international jurisprudence, as in many cases a shift towards distant reading, as conceived 
in the study of literature and literary history,158 can paint a more realistic picture of what is being done. 
Empirical approaches such as social network analysis applied to citation of precedent can be successfully 
employed to understand the aggregate of a phenomenon, as well as to restore context where it may 
otherwise appear lacking or mysterious. 
V. Conclusion: From disputes to the Holy Writ 
[I]t is not sufficient to have enough Arabic to be able to read the words inlaid on the walls of the 
Taj Mahal. It is at least as important to grasp that these are quotations from a sacred work and to 
know which the work in question is. Anyone who failed to understand that would fail fully to 
understand the communicative purpose of the texts and their role in the design of Shah Jahan's 
building.159 
The distinction between ratio and obiter, a rather technical aspect of one existing approach to precedent, 
does not work well in international adjudication, and it is mostly used as an argument to undermine the 
authority of prior judicial decisions, in continuity with in a long tradition that can be traced back at least 
to the Lotus case—rectius, the Lotus dictum.160 Indeed, adjudicators have been mostly unreceptive of the 
distinction. By and large, permanent courts have been eager to rely on previous statements made obiter, as 
well as to reject the importance of the distinction when confronted with such an argument. Investment 
arbitration tribunals, too, have shared in international investment arbitration as well, where arbitrators 
adopt, although not to the same degree of their colleagues sitting on permanent benches, a rather generous 
approach towards the pronouncements of other tribunals.  
There are some signals that a rule of precedent-recognition which accounts for a distinction between ratio 
and obiter may be developing at the international level. However, such a distinction is neither mandated 
                                               
156 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Baseball Arbitration to Resolve International Law Disputes: Hit or Miss?’ (Social Science Research 
Network 2018) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3155363 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3155363> accessed 12 June 2018. 
157 William L Reynolds and William M Richman, ‘The Non-Precedential Precedent–Limited Publication and No-Citation 
Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals’ (1978) 78 Columbia Law Review 1167; Salem M Katsh and Alex V Chachkes, 
‘Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules’ 39; Jessie Allen, ‘Just Words - The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of 
Appeals’ (2004) 29 Vermont Law Review 555. 
158 Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary History (Verso 2005); Franco Moretti, Distant Reading 
(Verso Books 2013); Bernadette Meyler, ‘The Rhetoric of Precedent’ in Austin Sarat (ed), Rhetorical Processes and Legal 
Judgments (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
159 Roy Harris, ‘The Semiology of Textualization’ (1984) 6 Language Sciences 271, 275. 
160 Compare the terminology adopted, for example, by SPIERMANN (N 53) 249. 
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by any rules on adjudication nor does it follow by necessary implication from the orthodoxy on the sources 
of international law. It remains an open question whether or not international adjudicators will become 
more receptive to one such approach, especially considering that enforcing it would be difficult with the 
existing systems of control—in fact, and not at all paradoxically, the contrary may be true.161 It is much 
more likely that the practice may find disincentives in other actors in the system—such as states, arbitral 
institutions, and the community of arbitrators—taking issue with both drafting and decision-making. Of 
course, this kind of inherently social enforcement can be far more effective in international arbitration 
than in permanent international courts.  
There is much to be said about the potential for dicta to be a positive externality of international 
adjudication. They allow for a clarification of the rules of law that may have been considered in a 
decision—even if that decision is ultimately taken on different grounds—and they form an important 
instrument in the adjudicator’s toolbox. From the perspective of an adjudicator who happens to be 
situated somewhere down the timeline, there are very few reasons why a statement made obiter should be 
less relevant for the determination of rules of international law, insofar it still is an authoritative statement 
that leads to increased clarity, efficiency, and consistency (practical reasons).  
Questions may undoubtedly arise whether a dictum appears to have arisen from nowhere, and certainly 
not from a sound confrontation with the parties. But it is submitted that the discussion of dicta in this 
context may be reconceived as one example in a broader phenomenon, that of textualization and 
decontextualization of precedent, which makes reliance on previous decisions problematic. A textualized 
precedent is far more likely to be employed out of context, through objectionable cut-and-paste 
techniques or otherwise.162 The abundant evidence supporting the claim that international adjudicators 
may have been slowly shifting towards a use of previous decisions that cannot be described as strictly ‘case-
bound’, but rather incorporates elements of the ‘legislative model’ described above, only adds to the 
uncertainty. It is for this reason that Roy Harris’s plea may be recalled: for today’s adjudicators, some 




                                               
161 William Michael Reisman, Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration: Breakdown and Repair (Duke 
University Press 1992) 71. 
162 Jacob (n 133) 95–7. 
